The discipline of digital forensics requires a combination of skills, qualifications and knowledge in the area of forensic investigation, legal aspects and information technology. The uniqueness of digital evidence makes the adoption of traditional legal approaches problematic.
Information technology terminology is currently used interchangeably without any regard to being unambiguous and consistent in relation to legal texts. Many of the information technology terms or concepts have not yet achieved legal recognition.
The recognition and standardisation of terminology within a legal context are of the utmost importance to ensure that miscommunication does not occur.
To provide clarity or guidance on some of the terms and concepts applicable to digital forensics and for the search and seizure of digital evidence, some of the concepts and terms are reviewed and discussed, using the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 as a point of departure.
Digital evidence is often collected incorrectly and analysed ineffectively or simply overlooked due to the complexities that digital evidence poses to forensic investigators. As with any forensic science, specific regulations, guidelines, principles or procedures should be followed to meet the objectives of investigations and to ensure the accuracy and acceptance of findings. These regulations, guidelines, principles or procedures are discussed within the context of digital forensics: what processes should be followed and how these processes ensure the acceptability of digital evidence. These processes include international principles and standards such as those of the Association of Chiefs of Police Officers and the International Organisation of Standardisation. A summary is also provided of the most influential or best-recognised international (IOS) standards on digital forensics.
Introduction
The discipline of digital forensics requires a combination of skills, qualifications and knowledge in the area of forensic investigation, legal aspects and information technology. 1 In many academic papers and court cases information technology terminology is used interchangeably without any regard to its being unambiguous and conducive to consistent interpretation of terminology in a legal context, which is why information technology terminology is largely unknown in the legal system. 2 Many information technology terms or concepts have not yet achieved legal recognition. This notion is supported by the South African Law Reform Commission (hereafter SALRC), 3 which has expressed the opinion that the earlier opinion that computers are "just like" filing cabinets does not hold true in the light of new technological capabilities. This was also the opinion of the Supreme Court in the Canadian case R v Vu. 4 Accurate legal definitions are vital to the operation of legal instruments, where words signify concepts in law, and the vocabulary consists of technical or legal terms and non-technical terms found in everyday language. 5 Many of the words used in legal discourse are derived from ordinary language, but the true development of legal terminology − to a great extent − is derived from legal discourse in courts and depends less on the parameters set for communication with regard to generally recognised legal science principles. 6 The recognition of terminology within a legal context is of the utmost importance to ensure that miscommunication does not occur. One should bear in mind that an initial understanding of texts may not be the only plausible interpretation. 7 This can especially be true in a digital environment where technical aspects can have an influence on the normal interpretation or understanding of terms. Although one acceptable meaning is the ideal, the interpretation of legal texts causes frequent problems, as the meaning denoted in texts may not be the same for all addressees. 8 In 1958 Hart 9 encapsulated this issue perfectly by stating that in the most elementary form of law, the terms used should exist in some standard instance in which no doubt exists about their interpretation. Hart 10 is of the opinion that there should be a "core of settled meaning".
In an attempt to provide clarity or guidance on some of the terms and concepts applicable to digital forensics and for the search and seizure of digital evidence, some of the concepts and terms are reviewed and discussed below.
In the early 1900s Dr Edmond Locard developed one of the cornerstones of modern-day forensic science, the Locard's exchange principle. 11 While studying medicine Locard developed an interest in the application of science to legal matters. 12 Locard theorised that every time a person or an object comes into contact with another, this results in an exchange of physical materials. Locard believed that during this contact all sorts of evidence, including human deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA), fingerprints, footprints, hair, skin cells, blood, bodily fluids, pieces of clothing, fibres and more are exchanged. 13 As early as in 1997 Silvernail 14 stated that when persons start to use a computer, evidence of activities is created. It is therefore recognised that the Locard principle also applies to computers 15 due to the evidential traces or artefacts exchanged between the network of victims and the computers of perpetrators. This is confirmed by Wang, 16 who emphasises the fact that digital evidence can prove crucial links between victims and perpetrators.
If it is recognised that computers have become an attractive medium for criminals 17 and that their activities on computers result in evidence that can be linked to the crimes of suspects, 18 it is essential to recognise the need for a discipline in the field of digital forensics.
Digital evidence is often collected incorrectly and analysed ineffectively or simply overlooked due to the complexities that digital evidence poses to forensic investigators. 19 This "new" type of evidence has prompted the beginning of a "new" type of forensic science − digital forensics. 20 As with any forensic science, specific regulations, guidelines, principles or procedures should be followed to meet the objectives of investigations, namely the accuracy and acceptance of findings. 21 These regulations, guidelines, principles or procedures are discussed in the context of digital forensics: what processes should be followed and how these processes ensure the acceptability of digital evidence.
A summary is also provided of the most influential or best-recognised international standards on digital forensics.
Terminology

Sections 20 and 21 of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977
Section 21 of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 relates to the power of authorised officials to issue search and seizure warrants.
The section furthermore authorises the police official to search and seize section 20 articles:
 which are concerned;  which may afford evidence;  which are intended to be used in the commission of a crime.
From this section, four concepts require further scrutiny on how these definitions relate to the digital environment, namely: The intrusive nature of search and seizure warrants and the obligation of the judicial system to guard against the misuse of this authority are welldocumented in the case of Powell v Van der Merwe. 22 During this case, it was said that South African law has a long history of scrutinising search and seizure warrants with rigour and exactitude and that the common law rights are now enshrined in section 14 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. Because of the danger of misuse during the application of authority with regard to search and seizure warrants, the judiciary scrutinises the validity of warrants with jealous regard for the liberty of suspects and their rights. The scope of the terms is even more relevant in cases involving digital evidence due to the wide scope of personal and confidential information kept on the digital devices of persons. 23 The Explanatory Report to the Convention on Cybercrime of the Council of Europe suggests that additional procedural provisions are necessary in order to ensure that data can be secured in a manner as effective as in the case of the search and seizure of tangible objects. 24 This is firstly because the data are intangible -they are in an electromagnetic medium. Secondly, while data can be read by making use of computer equipment, data cannot be taken away in the same sense as paper records. 25 Kerr 26 captures some of the complexities of digital evidence as follows: "How can the old rules fit the new facts? For example, what does it mean to 'search' computer data, or when is computer data 'seized'?" The Explanatory Report to the Convention on Cybercrime further suggests that data can be "seized" in only a specific number of ways, namely data can be printed and seized; the tangible medium upon which data is stored can be seized; or a forensic duplicate can be made of the data and the tangible form upon which the copy is saved can be seized. 
Defining the search for digital evidence
Kerr 28 suggests that forensic investigators should first search for and locate physical devices ("search one"). Then, forensic investigators should access and search these physical devices for relevant information or data ("search two"). For the purpose of this article, references to "search" are extended from Kerr's two-step process to include three phases, namely:  The traditional process in which forensic investigators search for or locate physical computers on a scene.

The forensic investigators search for or segregate relevant and nonrelevant information/data on these computers.
The analysis or interpretation of relevant information within the context of a larger investigation.
This discussion of the definition of "search" relates to the later steps followed when data is searched, since it is acknowledged that the search for physical articles on premises is well-defined and understood in the law.
The phenomenon of seizing's taking place before a search has taken place is discussed by Brenner and Fredericksen, 29 who state that a search and seizure of digital evidence turns a normal search and seizure on its head in the sense that computers are normally first seized and then searched. In the case of the Minister of Safety and Security v Bennett, 30 it was recognised that in instances where large collections of physical documents are located on a scene, and when it is impractical to separate or effectively search these documents on the scene, a broad seizure of the collection of physical documents is permitted, pending a later search to segregate relevant and non-relevant information.
The Explanatory Report to the Convention on Cybercrime proposes that traditional words such as "search" and "seize" should be replaced with more technological-orientated computer terms, such as "access" and "copy". 31 This proposal is supported by Nieman, 32 who is of the opinion that "search and seize" can more accurately described when computer terminology is used that is more neutral in meaning and can include actions, such as the Merely observing a room does not constitute a fully-fledged search. 37 Kerr 38 proposes that an "exposure-based approach" should be adopted and that data should be considered to have been "searched" only when the data were exposed to human observation. being limited resources − is that police officials in the most cases seize computers on scenes and then transfer articles to central digital forensic laboratories. During this interview, it was stated that some of the digital forensic laboratories are months − even more than a year − behind in their workload. 47 The interviewee 48 estimated that on average persons are deprived of their computers (or cellular phones) for between five days to two years.
In the light of the unique way in which digital evidence is normally collected or "seized", Kerr 49 poses a number of questions with regard to the interpretation of when digital evidence is considered seized, namely: Kerr 50 states that these aspects are surprisingly difficult to interpret and at first sight it seems sensible to say that the creation of forensic duplicates constitutes a seizure of evidence. In the United States case of Arizona v Hicks 51 an investigator copied the serial number on a stereo system to establish later whether or not it was stolen goods. The court held that the copying of this information did not constitute a seizure. The court also held that the recording, copying or taking of a photograph of information on a scene does not constitute a seizure. This finding highlights the question whether forensic duplicates of computers constitute a seizure. Kerr 52 further reviewed these complexities by arguing that if the creation of forensic duplicates is not recognised as constituting a search and seizure − since the data were not exposed, read or observed by humans, but only forensically duplicated -this could drastically expand the powers of the forensic investigators. In addition, Kerr maintains that should the making of forensic duplicates not be viewed as a search and seizure, the forensic investigators would not need search and seizure warrants, and Kerr refers to such a situation as "troublesome" and downright "creepy". The Explanatory Report to the Convention on Cybercrime 53 proposes that "seize" should also include "to take away the physical medium which stores the data" or to make and retain forensic duplicates of data. This proposal is supported by Basdeo, 54 who is of the opinion that the seizure of data includes not only the confiscation of data but also the "gathering" of data.
The concept of seizure is important, and it is therefore necessary to consider the way in which and the reason why forensic duplicates are created. Nieman 55 explains that forensic duplicates do exactly what the name suggests − bit-by-bit exact duplicates of every sector of a hard drive are created. The requirement of section 14 of the Electronic Communications and Transactions Act 25 of 2002 relating to the originality of evidence stipulates that where the law requires information to be presented or retained in its original form, that requirement is met if the integrity of the digital evidence from the time it was first generated to its final form has passed assessment. Vacca 56 states that a new concept of representational accuracy has emerged in terms of digital evidence − it is not necessary anymore to present the original. If forensic duplicates are created that depict the source data exactly, these duplicates can be considered originals. However, after forensic duplicates of computers are created and the originals are handed back to suspects, as soon as a person switches on the computer the content of that computer changes on a continual basis. 57
The proposed Cybercrimes and Cybersecurity Bill provides a more inclusive definition for "seize" by including the rendering of data inaccessible, the removal of physical devices, to make or retain forensic duplicates, or to make a printout of data. 58 For the purposes of this article, the interpretation of "seizure" includes the creation of forensically-sound duplicate originals, and the seizure or retention of these duplicates is viewed by the State as originals.
Defining premises and containers
Section 1 of the Criminal Procedure Act defines "premises" as "including land, any building or structure, or any vehicle, conveyance, ship, boat or aircraft". It is questioned whether this definition permits the inclusion of a computer as a premises and does this definition permit the search of For the purpose of this article, the interpretation of "premises" is limited to the traditional description of premises or locations and not extended to describing devices as separate premises or the premises of digital forensic investigators. For the purpose of this paper, the interpretation of "articles" or "items" as per the proposed Cybercrimes and Cybersecurity Bill is supported to include data, data storage devices and data processing devices. suspected crime should be accurately described in line with the enabling legislation, and colloquially used terms should not be applied. The Electronic Communications and Transactions Act describes "data" as the electronic representation of information in any form, and "data messages" as data generated, sent, received or stored by electronic means. The SALRC further explains that in Part 2 of the UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Commerce (1996) it is stated that the concept of data messages is not intended to be limited to communication, but should include computer records and all types of messages that are generated, stored or communicated in a paperless form. 76
Defining articles or items
Defining data and data messages
For the purpose of this article, the definition of "data" is adapted from section 1 of the Electronic Communications and Transactions Act as is "the digital representation of information in any form", and not the "electronic representation of data in any form".
Digital, computer, electronic or cyber evidence
The SALRC observes that Article 2 of the UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Commerce refers to "data" and "data messages" rather than to "electronic evidence" or "digital evidence". 77 The reason for this is obvious, since the Model Law on Electronic Commerce, which forms the basis of the South African Electronic Communications and Transactions Act, is aimed at regulating e-commerce, and only a small portion of it relates to defining criminal activities. The Model Law on Electronic Commerce stipulates that the law applies to all commercial activities. 78 It is therefore logical rather to use descriptions such as "data" or "data messages". Data or data messages become relevant during investigations into criminal activities, when "electronic evidence" or "digital evidence" should be used. Bouwer 79 recommends that a single definition for "electronic evidence" should be adopted in the South African law as "information of probative value stored or transmitted in digital format".
References to "computer" evidence or "computer" crime seem to be outdated. 80 The For the purpose of this article, the term "digital" is used as opposed to the terms "electronic", "cyber" or "computer". 
Forensic duplicating processes in relation to originality

Raw images − exact bit-by-bit copies of disks into a single file. Raw images do not contain information regarding the creation of these images.
According to Gerber, 95 forensic duplicates were previously also referred to as "mirror" images, but because the term confused courts, the use of "mirror" images is not recommended. Normally, mirror images are reverse images of originals.
All of these different terms can be confusing, but nowhere was it found in research that any of the terms used − except for "mirror copies" -has been rejected by courts.
In the light of the above, a single expression could prove to be technically incorrect in all situations. Whatever terminology is used, Lidbury and Boland 96 state that what makes "collections" forensically sound should be the main aim − whether data were collected is an exact duplicate of the original source, including metadata. This implies that the collection method and subsequent analysis steps should not alter data and should include mechanisms to ensure the integrity of the data, such as the extraction of hash values. The judicial measures within a South African environment are the requirements specified by section 14 of the Electronic Communications and Transactions Act − the originality of data messages is measured against the integrity of digital evidence from the time the data were first generated. Integrity is assessed by considering whether the evidence has remained complete and unaltered except for the adding of endorsements or changes which are caused in the normal course of communication. For the purpose of this article, the most elucidating description, which should make room for interpretation, is the creation of "forensically-sound duplicate original records" (hereafter forensic duplicates).
Digital forensics and international standards
Digital forensics
Many definitions of digital forensics exist. Palmer 103 captures the main aspects as the use of scientifically-derived and proven methods in locating, collecting, preserving, analysing, interpreting, documenting and presenting digital evidence relating to incidents, often with the aim of presenting evidence during hearings. The goal of the process is to preserve evidence in its most original form while performing a structured analysis by collecting, identifying and validating digital information for the purpose of reconstructing past events. (22) 19
As a scientific-based discipline, digital forensics is premised on following set standards or methodologies in the processes defined above, which are susceptible to inspection by judiciaries. 104
International standards
Nieman 105 states that it is ironic that digital forensics first and foremost concerns forensic procedure, rules of evidence, legal concepts, precedents and processes and, second to this, computers. It is exactly because of this that standards in this field play such an important role.
Most of the "standards" are presented as guidelines as opposed to set standards. 106 In the light of the importance of standards or the important role that standards should play in digital forensics as a science, it is surprising that there are no set standards, rules or a protocol for the handling of digital evidence, and that technical processes applied to digital evidence "do not have to pass any formal test" for digital evidence to be placed before courts. 107 It is therefore understandable that the digital forensic industry has largely been self-regulated within a framework of internationally advised practices, case law, guidelines and industry groups.
Principles of the Association of Chief of Police Officers
The  Principle 2: Only in exceptional situations should investigators work with or access the original data and only if they are competent to do so and in a position to provide evidence explaining the relevance and the implications of their actions.
 Principle 3:
All processes applied to the digital evidence by investigators should be fully recorded to enable independent third party experts to follow these processes and reach the same results.
 Principle 4:
Investigators should ensure that all legal principles are adhered to during the analysis of digital evidence.
The principles provide guidelines so that the actions of investigators do not change the digital evidence under investigation, and if original evidence is accessed, this should be done by competent persons. A complete audit trail should be maintained so that the actions of investigators can be reviewed, assessed and evaluated against local legal requirements. These international principles were drafted with the aim of ensuring that the handling of digital evidence conforms to the requirements of evidence in terms of the law and especially to ensure that the integrity of evidence is maintained by ensuring that data have remained unaltered. 115 The SALRC 116 affirmed the importance of these principles when the commission stated that by accessing files, the actions of forensic investigators are not neutral and it is not easy to prove the integrity of digital evidence given the volatile nature of digital evidence. It has also been stated that the incorrect following of crime scene protocols and proper procedures can render digital evidence unusable or vulnerable to claims of prejudicial distortion by the defence. 117 it is stated that it merely provides "guidelines for specific activities in handling potential digital evidence; these processes are: identification, collection, acquisition and preservation of potential digital evidence".
Standards and guidelines of the International Organisation of Standardisation
The processes specified in the standard set guidelines to ensure that digital forensic investigators maintain the integrity of digital evidence during the collection phases of investigations by following analysis methodologies aimed at advancing the admissibility of evidence during legal processes. The importance of the integrity of evidence is supported by Kanellis, 118 who emphasises that evidence should be managed correctly so that it cannot lose value and as a result, be inadmissible in courts. The ISO/IEC DIS 27037 Standard sets out four fundamental principles for procedures to be followed in collecting digital evidence.  Document all actions taken and account for any alterations in the data to allow experts to express an opinion regarding the reliability of the data.

Adhere to local rules of evidence.
 Not take any actions beyond their competence.
The ISO/IEC DIS 27037 Standard specifies that, in most jurisdictions, digital evidence is governed by three primary principles: 120  Relevance A standard requirement is that only relevant data should be collected. In other words, the data collected should assist in examining incidents or aspects of incidents at hand and there should be a need and a reason to collect the data. This requirement is supported by sections 28, 31 and 210 of the Criminal Procedure Act, which regulate wrongful searches and seizures, the inadmissibility of irrelevant evidence and the return of articles not required for criminal proceedings. Digital forensic investigators should be in a position to explain the procedures followed and validate the reasons and grounds why specific data were collected. Francoeur 121 explains that any evidence should have an adequate level of relevance to the matter investigated.
 Reliability
All processes followed in handling digital evidence should be auditable and repeatable. The result of applying these processes should be reproducible by independent parties when they follow the same process. Hofman 122 highlights that digital evidence should satisfy ordinary requirements related to the admissibility of documents. Documents should be authentic, reliable and original.
 Sufficiency Digital forensic investigators should ensure that all relevant information is collected to ensure that the matter at hand can be sufficiently analysed and considered. Digital forensic investigators should be able to provide an indication of how much data was considered and should be able to justify the decision about what data and how much data to acquire.
The ISO/IEC DIS 27037 Standard specifies that all processes in relation to digital forensic investigations should be: 123
 Auditable
All processes, procedures and results should be auditable by independent forensic investigators to evaluate the activities performed by digital forensic investigators. Audits can be facilitated if the processes and actions followed by digital forensic investigators are sufficiently documented. Digital forensic investigators should be able to explain the basis upon which decisions were taken and the choice of methodology followed during analyses.
 Repeatability
Repeatability is established when the same results are obtained in the following situations: o when the same procedures and methods are used; o when the same equipment under the same conditions is used.
It should be noted that repeatability is not possible in all situations -for example, where live data was analysed, or volatile memory. In this case, digital forensic investigators should ensure that acquisition processes are reliable.  Justifiability Digital forensic investigators should be able to validate all actions and methods used in identifying, collecting, analysing and managing potential digital evidence. Justification can be achieved by demonstrating that their decisions were best practice in a specific case in obtaining all of the potential digital evidence in existing circumstances.
In terms of handling digital evidence, the ISO/IEC DIS 27037 Standard advises that "devices that may contain potential digital evidence [should be] removed from their original location to a laboratory or another controlled environment for later acquisition and analysis" and that forensic duplicates should be made for analyses to take place. 124 The standard sets out a number of phases during digital forensic investigations, 125 which directly relate to searches and seizures, namely:
 Identification -which includes the search for data storage devices, the recognition thereof and the documentation of processes followed. It also entails the prioritisation of the sequence of methods used to secure digital evidence, which can be volatile.
 Collection -which relates to the collection and removal of evidence or the acquisition of evidence on a scene.
 Acquisition -which entails the creation of forensically sound duplicates of evidence in the least restrictive manner possible.
 Preserving evidence − from the point of collection throughout all of the digital forensic processes followed.
These phases are described during the process of digital seizures and divided into two distinctly different stages, namely the search of physical devices on a scene and later searches for relevant data. and it is the forensic duplicates that are analysed. 127 The process followed in creating forensic duplicates should ultimately stand up to legal scrutiny. 128 The collection of digital evidence is a forensic and procedural process which should always be performed with care. 129 Data should be collected in such a way that the information is retained in the exact state in which it was found. 130 Cross 131 explains that "acquisition" refers to the process of collecting digital evidence from specific devices, normally the computers of suspects or victims.
The process of creating forensic duplicates usually commences by removing the hard drive from the computer of the victim or suspect and by connecting the hard drive to a write-protector device. 132 This procedure is in line with the principles set out by the ACPO 133 and the IOS 134 − the actions of investigators should not change data and, where possible, forensic duplicates should be made of the relevant data and these forensic duplicates should be analysed.
A write-protector device places a computer in a read-only form. 135 This device prevents actions taken by investigators, such as opening and closing files or searching through files from influencing or changing metadata. This device allows digital forensic investigators to conduct preliminary searches on computers to establish whether these computers contain relevant information or not.
At this stage, evidence can be browsed to determine whether it contains relevant evidence or whether imaging can be started without browsing the evidence. Once it is determined that devices contain relevant evidence, forensic duplicates of the evidence should be made. This is done by means of a number of forensic software programs which allow digital forensic investigators to create forensic duplicates of devices. Three of the parallel processes set out by the standard are of paramount importance:
Obtaining authorisation
Proper authorisation should be obtained for each process performed during an investigation. Authorisation may be required from government authorities, system owners, system custodians and principals. For the purpose of this article, proper authorisation is achieved through the application for search and seizure warrants in terms of the provisions stipulated in sections 20 and 21 of the Criminal Procedure Act.
Preserving the chain of custody
A traditional requirement for proving the integrity of evidence is the chain of custody. Van der Merwe et al. 156 state that the prosecution needs to convince the court that the evidence was not interfered with from the time it was seized to the presentation in court. It is therefore critical that forensic investigators should ensure that digital evidence remains secure throughout the analysis. 157 The chain of custody requirements were expanded upon in the ISO/IEC DIS 27037 Standard. These requirements relate to the ability of digital forensic investigators to account for all the acquired evidence from the point when it was within their custody. 158 
Conclusions
It is evident that the uniqueness of digital evidence poses complications to traditional legal approaches. Digital evidence encompasses both tangible devices and intangible data and requires special methodologies to identify and collect all relevant evidence. The seizure of all data on computers can be viewed as a too extensive action due to the fact that not all of the relevant information is contained in files. It can reside in different locations on computers. The technical nature of cybercrimes and subsequent technical expert testimony adds further dynamics that are faced by digital forensic investigators.
The technical analysis and interpretation of terminology in relation to digital evidence are aspects that will be debated at length in South African courts in years to come. These interpretations can be problematic in terms of data, but a sound understanding can be gained from case law with regard to technical issues. It is argued that the "premises" described in search and seizure warrants should be the premises of suspects, and the interpretation of "search" should include actions in which the content of data becomes exposed. It is proposed that "search actions" such as look, locate, separate the information, interpret and analyse should be recognised. The creation of forensically-sound duplicate original records should constitute the seizure of data as items or articles of digital information in any form and should be recognised as original duplicates.
The originality, reliability, integrity and admissibility of digital evidence should be maintained as follows: 
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